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ANTICIPATING INSTEAD OF 
PREVENTING: USING THE 
POTENTIAL OF CRIME RISK 
ASSESSMENT IN ORDER TO 
MINIMIZE THE RISKS OF 
ORGANIZED AND OTHER TYPES 
OF CRIME 
 
1. On the necessity of crime pre-
vention 
 
Crime prevention as an option in the con-
trol of crime is gaining momentum. A re-
cent United Nations resolution states that 
"the prevention of crime through non-
punitive measures is to be considered an 
important complement to the administra-
tion of criminal law" (ECOSOC, para. 1). 
The resolution further maintains that "the 
concept of crime prevention should not be 
limited to conventional forms of crime, 
including domestic violence, but should 
encompass new forms of crime, such as 
organized crime, terrorism, illegal traffick-
ing in migrants, computer and cyber-
crimes, environmental crime, corruption 
and illegal commerce related to the ac-
quisition and development of weapons to 
mass destruction" (op. cit., para. 2). Fur-
thermore, account should also be taken of 
"the growing internationalization of crimi-
nal activities and the relationship between 
the global economy, advanced technolo-
gies and national phenomena of crime" 
(op. cit., para. 3). It would thus be advisa-
ble always to consider any law reform 
programme in the context of a social ac-
tivity involving the potential for crime from 
two angles - both that of the law enforce-
ment and that of prevention. 
 
There is wide consensus that it is not 
enough to control crime through reactive 
intervention and punitive means alone. 
The deterrent effect of coercion - whether 
we are thinking of individual or general 
deterrence - in the traditional sense of the 
concept does not always work very well in 
modern society (see, e.g. Ashworth, pp. 
1097-1098). As Pease points out, "we 
should constantly remind ourselves that, 
in crime, we have a set of actions or omis-
sions united only in their proscription by 
law" (Pease, p. 963). According to Pease, 
"because an action is a crime, this does 
not mean that the best way to control it is 
through the police and the courts. The be-
haviour itself must be understood, to de-
termine where change could best be 
brought about" (op. cit., p. 963). Similarly, 
Graham and Bennett are of the opinion 
that "during the 1970s and 1980s there 
was a rapid loss of faith in the ability of the 
criminal justice system  to reduce crime or 
criminality" (Graham & Bennett, p. 1). In 
sum, "crime, disorder and fear of crime 
have become major concerns for the gov-
ernment and many communities. Tradi-
tional responses to these concerns - such 
as more police and tougher penalties - are 
no longer sufficient as the benefits of in-
tervening before crime is committed be-
come more and more evident" (Glanfield, 
p. x). Consequently, and particularly with 
the concern over the increasing risk of 
transnational organized crime, great ef-
forts to develop preventive strategies can 
be observed both nationally and interna-
tionally (see, e.g. Lely & van Toorn; Euro-
pean Union, Action Plan). 
 
Various categorizations have been devel-
oped in order to describe approaches to 
crime prevention (see, e.g. Graham & 
Bennett, pp. 5-7). One well-known classi-
fication in this area is the following typol-
ogy: 
- 'Criminality prevention' (also called 'so-
cial' or 'offender oriented' crime preven-
tion); 
- 'Situational crime prevention'; and  
 
 
 
 
HEUNI Paper No.11                         5                                           Seppo Leppä 
 
- 'Community crime prevention' (op. cit., p. 
7).  
 
2. Organized crime: a problematic 
issue in terms of prevention 
 
Situational and community prevention are 
applied, as a rule, in response to ob-
served criminal activity1. Criminality prev-
ention, on the other hand, aims at the so-
cialization of potential offenders. Thus, 
criminality prevention targets risk groups 
and individuals before the initiation of 
criminal careers2. All this, however, re-
flects the preoccupation of societies, both 
national and international, primarily with 
traditional mass or conventional crime.  
 
However, organized crime and other types 
of so-called modern crime, as listed in the 
ECOSOC resolution mentioned above - 
whether national or transnational in char-
acter - pose a problem in this respect. 
Profit-making could be understood to be 
the major goal of all kinds of criminal ac-
tivities in this category - even gaining 
power can be seen just as a means of 
reaching that goal (cf. Arlacchi, p. 205) - if 
we put aside the cases of pure negligence 
(as is the case with some environmental 
                                                 
     1 Examples in this respect are: (i) target 
hardening in respect of situational prevention, 
and (ii) global efforts to prevent laundering of 
illegal assets by means of cooperation with 
financial institutions - a type of community 
prevention. 
     2 A corresponding typology can also be 
observed in the fields of sentencing and cor-
rections.  'Incapacitative sentencing' can be 
seen as the counterpart of 'situational and 
community prevention', while 'rehabilitative 
sentencing', on the other hand, can be seen 
as the counterpart of 'criminality prevention' 
(Ashworth, pp. 1098 - 1099). 
crime) or mischievousness (as is the case 
with some computer and cyber-
crime/crackers). In addition, "develop-
ments that have made it possible to move 
goods, people and money through the 
global economy - and have traditionally 
been regarded by international political 
economy specialists as positive and be-
nign in their effects - have facilitated the 
movement of 'dirty money', as well as the 
transportation of drugs, arms, illegal al-
iens, and nuclear material" (Godson & 
Williams, pp. 3 - 4). The result, according 
to Williams, is that "criminals, in effect, 
ignore or transcend borders in the pursuit 
of profit, but use variations in national 
laws, in the effectiveness of criminal jus-
tice systems, and in the efficiency and 
effectiveness of law enforcement bodies 
to minimize the risk that they will be ap-
prehended or punished" (Williams, p. 2). 
 
These facts make it rather difficult to de-
velop workable prevention efforts to com-
bat modern types of illegal acts within the 
classifications mentioned. Criminality pre-
vention will rarely be relevant and viable in 
this context due to the nature of the of-
fences, although, according to Godson 
and Williams "preventive educational pro-
grams in primary and secondary schools 
throughout the world - what specialists 
refer to as 'legal socialization' - might turn 
out to be an important ingredient in the 
overall global strategic mix", since "al-
ready some regions have created civic 
education programs to counter crime and 
corruption" (Godson & Williams, p. 34). 
They give as an example the city of Pa-
lermo in Italy, where 25 000 children every 
year attend an educational program de-
signed to change the cultural norms that 
allow the Mafia to flourish. 
 
As Arlacchi points out, "a number of stud-
ies have shown that we are faced with ra-
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tional economic phenomena and well-
structured 'industries'. Illegal markets have 
much in common with their legal counter-
parts" (Arlacchi, p. 204). Similarly, Wil-
liams claims that "indeed some of the ma-
jor organizations that have emerged have 
more in common with major transnational 
corporations than they do with the old 
style mob" (Williams, p. 2). Community 
prevention and situational prevention 
might sometimes provide a feasible frame 
of reference, but in a great majority of 
cases they are not viable either. There are 
several reasons for this. First, as a rule 
the preventive efforts are not carried out 
but until at a fairly late stage, very often 
not before various interest groups have 
started demanding that something be 
done. It might not be easy to introduce a 
new measure, especially since these 
measures often hit legal and illegal activit-
ies alike. Business life, for example, is not 
necessarily happy with retroactive preven-
tive measures imposed by policy makers. 
Such measures can easily be experienced 
as  infringement and red tape. Second, 
more often than not the offenders are 
several steps ahead of the designers of 
the prevention strategies, which means 
that the policy makers in the field in ques-
tion will have to be involved in a continu-
ous struggle against time3, since, as 
Mueller writes, "the ingenuity of transna-
tional criminal organizers and organza-
tions may outrun our contemporary ef-
forts" (Mueller, p. 15). Lastly, successful 
                                                 
     3 Sometimes, on the other hand, new tech-
nical inventions may in a very short time revo-
lutionize the ways and means of prevention 
targeting a profit crime category. As a matter 
of fact, technical innovations may lead to law 
reforms while the case is very seldom vice 
versa, which means that this type of situational 
crime prevention will not be of any significant 
utility in this sector in the foreseeable future. 
prevention in this sector sometimes would 
call for the changing of deeply rooted be-
haviour patterns of entire populations (cf. 
the Palermo example quoted above). 
 
3. A potential solution; anticipa-
tion /early awareness of crime 
risks 
 
An optional approach to the dilemma 
might be to introduce preventive reactions 
as early as possible, for example by antic-
ipating the potential risks of crime that a 
law reform might bring forth, instead of 
designing reparative preventive steps ei-
ther in the course of implementing the 
agreed upon reform or during the law en-
forcement phase, as deemed necessary. 
Thus, what is needed is early awareness 
of the potential risks and a method of as-
sessing their seriousness. Godson and 
Williams are of the opinion that "anticipat-
ing emerging crime threats provides op-
portunities for both preventive and 
preemptive actions that can have maxi-
mum impact, by allowing government and 
law enforcement agencies to be proactive 
rather than reactive" (Godson & Williams, 
p. 24) 
 
In drafting any national or transnational 
legislative instrument dealing with finan-
cial matters4, the potential crime risks 
                                                 
     4 There are, naturally, exceptions to be 
worked out on a case by case basis - it is for 
example quite difficult to maintain that legisla-
tion regulating dispute settlement in business 
life, nationally or internationally, by arbitration 
as such must consider crime risks even 
though great financial interests might be at 
stake. It is quite another issue that a certain 
part of the assets in dispute might have previ-
ously originated through shady business 
transactions. 
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should be considered. This is because, 
firstly, profit-making is inherently connect-
ed with any economic activity (as already 
noted), and secondly, seeking loopholes 
in legislative structures in order to gain 
economic benefits seems to be a basic 
instinct in modern society. Transnational 
instruments of this type should, further-
more, take into account that "some crimi-
nal organizations have structured their 
operations so that only minor crimes are 
committed in any single national jurisdic-
tion. The totality of their activities may be 
spread across a number of national 
jursidictions and specific actions (such as 
investing cash in legitimate businessess, 
or losing money at gambling establish-
ments) may not be crimes. In some cases, 
crime must be considered not as a single 
act, but as participation in a process" (op. 
cit., p. 31, italics by the authors). 
 
4. A particular concern: law reform 
outside of the crime sector 
 
The potential crime risks are not, as a 
rule, given serious consideration in law 
reform projects, unless clearly defined 
features of criminal behaviour are known 
to intersect with legally acceptable activi-
ties. This is particularly true of reform work 
primarily involving experts outside the 
sphere of crime prevention and criminal 
justice, but also to some degree within the 
crime prevention and criminal justice 
community. Checking relevant parts of 
draft legislation more often for provisions 
that may open up or facilitate opportunities 
for crime might significantly facilitate the 
minimizing of potential crime risks, since 
"knowing one's 'enemy' is (...) important" 
(Lely & van Toorn, p. 7). Consultations 
with, and the advice of, law enforcers 
might be a good starting point in this re-
spect. Obviously, it is not very often the 
people involved in law enforcement field 
work - police officers and the like - are 
consulted at an early stage of a law reform 
project, if the scope of the reform is out-
side the field of their expressed com-
petence. And at the same time those peo-
ple are, as a rule, the real experts on the 
potential crime risks involved, regardless 
of whether the draft legislation deals with 
public procurement, regional subsidies or 
consumer issues. Pooling the best re-
sources of both parties, the practitioners 
and the planners of reforms, might per-
haps result in an optimum mix in this re-
spect. 
 
4.1 Examples of crime risk catego-
ries of particular relevance in this 
context  
 
It is not viable at this stage to produce a 
complete list of all of the potential crime 
risk categories that should be considered 
when a law reform project of the type ref-
ered to here is initiated. The potential 
crime risk categories attached to any par-
ticular reform activity must be scrutinized 
on a case by case basis. It is, however, 
feasible already now to present a sum-
mary overview of a few of these risk cate-
gories that can be observed time after 
time in this context. 
 
4.1.1 Money laundering 
Money laundering must be seen as an 
overall threat in this respect, as a chal-
lenge for shady businessmen. The main 
type of laundering which can be envis-
aged here is the investment of assets 
gained by illegal means in legitimate busi-
ness in order to launder them, without fur-
ther thought to actually using the business 
to engage in competition (on this, see 
below under 4.1.3). 
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4.1.2 Corruption 
Also corruption should be conceived as an 
overall threat, always potentially present 
when profit-making operations are regu-
lated by legislative efforts. Two of the var-
ious categories of corruption defined by 
van Duyne (van Duyne, pp. 5-16) are 
highly relevant in this context,  namely (i) 
public/private sector corruption, i.e. cor-
ruption between a private person or cor-
poration and an official, and (ii) private 
sector/political corruption, i.e. corruption 
between the private sector and the hold-
ers of political office.5 
 
4.1.3 Purposeful infiltration of legal 
business 
Two categories of somewhat dubious 
business manipulations are of interest 
here. One category is investment in a le-
gitimate business of means already laun-
dered elsewhere either in order to 
strengthen the image of a business oper-
ating within the limits of law, or in order to 
weaken the position of competitors. The 
other category is premeditated attempts to 
profit by taking over a financially sound 
company and emptying it of assets. 
 
4.1.4 Falsification of documents 
Last but not least, production and presen-
tation of false documents might be com-
                                                 
     5 Also "private sector corruption" as defined 
by van Duyne might in some cases qualify as 
corruption (he mentions "bidding manipulation" 
as an example) in the sense given to the term 
in this article, although as he himself points 
out: "strictly speaking this is not corruption but 
bid-rigging" (van Duyne, p. 12). 
bined with the other three crime risk cate-
gories listed here. This illegal activity 
should, however, also be regarded as 
having a role as an independent offence 
as such. The purpose of the perpetrator in 
such a case is simply to make an attempt 
to profit in a competitive market under the 
disguise of false pretences. 
 
5. Assessing organized crime risks 
in the context of legislative re-
forms; presentation of a potential 
method for anticipation 
 
There is, however, no guarantee that just 
bringing together the best expertise will 
automatically lead to the paying of atten-
tion to all potential crime risks encom-
passed in a law reform project. In addition, 
also on the methodological side we must 
visualize an approach that is, as far as 
possible, fool-proof. It is often sensible to 
look for that kind of approach outside the 
discipline in question. A methodological 
tool that has already been developed and 
widely used in environmental planning and 
policy making might offer a suitable solu-
tion. The Environmental Impact Assess-
ment (EIA) is one such instrument. The 
EIA seeks to bring to light "the impacts of 
various actions and their options which 
may significantly affect the natural, built-
up and social environment" (Leskinen, 
Salminen & Turtiainen, p. VII). After the 
need of a EIA process has been estab-
lished, the following operational steps 
should be covered, according to the mod-
el:  
(1) examining the objectives of the pro-
posed project and alternatives to it,  
(2) identifying the impacts and delineating 
the impact options,  
(3) retrieving and presenting the baseline 
data,  
(4) predicting the impacts, interpreting and 
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evaluating the weight of them,  
(5) developing ways and means to miti-
gate or ameliorate adverse impacts,  
(6) comparing alternatives,  
(7) elaborating a draft EIA report,  
(8) reviewing the draft report,  
(9) preparing a final EIA report,  
(10) making of a decision, and  
(11) monitoring the impacts and auditing 
the success of the whole procedure6 (Mor-
ris & Therivel, pp. 4 - 6). 
 
Quite obviously the EIA model as such is 
not directly suitable as a tool in a totally 
different setting, for assessing crime risks 
in the field of legislative efforts with partic-
ular attention to law reforms that open up -
a potential for making a profit. A modified 
version must be designed in order to 
make it possible to utilize the method in 
full in this new milieu. 
 
First and foremost, it must be kept in mind 
that the reliability of the baseline data will 
be at a considerably lower level than is the 
case in the environmental context. Instead 
of reliance on quantitative data alone - in 
the form of numerical, statistical infor-
mation - the weight must be on the intelli-
gence type of information, i.e. primarily on 
qualitative data, which consists of anecdo-
tal and documentary material combined 
with some figures7. The problem is that 
this approach may easily lead us to ques-
                                                 
     6 For a more detailed overview of the EIA 
process, please see Annex I. 
     7 It is not possible to envisage relevant and 
reliable quantitative indicators pointing to acts 
of modern crime - data on the activities of the 
law enforcement and judicial authorities do not 
give us reliable information about this type of 
criminality. Indicators must be seen as prod-
ucts of observations. Data in this field simply 
do not meet this condition. 
tion the validity of the impacts identified if 
we are not extremely cautious in verifying 
our data. 
 
Having noted these words of warning we 
can now seek to modify the EIA model for 
the purposes of crime risk assessment. 
The main point to keep in mind is that all 
the crucial components of the procedure - 
the objectives, the impact options, the 
baseline data, the evaluation of the weight 
of the impacts, the mitigation/amelioration 
of adverse impacts, the monitoring of the 
impacts after the decision making, and the 
auditing of the outcome - must be consid-
ered. When developing an instrument for 
Crime Risk Assessment (CRA) the follow-
ing steps of the EIA process should, as a  
minimum, be followed mutatis mutandis 
(after the self-evident establishment of a 
need for a CRA process): 
 
(i) The examination of the objectives of 
the proposed legal reform project; 
 
(ii) The identification of its adverse im-
pacts, i.e. of crime risks connected with 
the proposed reform; 
 
(iii) The retrieval and the presentation of 
the baseline data (noting the cautions 
referred to above); 
 
(iv) The interpretation and the evaluation 
of the weight of the adverse impacts; de-
veloping ways and means of mitigating the 
problem, including suggestions for moni-
toring the impacts and auditing the suc-
cess of the programme; and 
 
(v) The merger of the conclusions ema-
nating from the CRA process with the text 
of the law reform before a final decision is 
taken. 
 
So far this model is only a hypothetical 
 
 
 
 
HEUNI Paper No.11                         10                                           Seppo Leppä 
 
one. In the following, an attempt is made 
to utilize the CRA approach in analyzing 
three cases of legal reform programmes 
with financial implications. The cases cho-
sen as examples represent a diminishing 
scale of direct involvement in the drafting 
of the programmes by criminal justice ex-
perts and practitioners. 
 
6. Three case studies 
 
In this section the applicability of the CRA 
process is tested on three real-life cases 
of transnational law reforms that have 
opened up a major potential for making a 
profit. The aim here is to make an attempt 
to explore, first, what kinds of crime risk 
categories are associated with the re-
forms, and, second, whether indeed antic-
ipation and early awareness: (i) have 
helped in avoiding or minimizing crime 
risks in the first case, (ii) might have 
helped in avoiding or minimizing crime 
risks in the second case, and (iii) might 
help in avoiding or minimizing crime risks 
in the last case.  
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6.1 Basel convention on the control 
of transboundary movements of 
hazardous wastes and their dis-
posal 
 
The text of the Basel Convention on the 
Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal 
was negotiated by the states parties at the 
end of the 1980s and finalized at the be-
ginning of the 1990s. The convention en-
tered into force on 5 May 1992 (cf. United 
Nations Environment Programme1989).  
 
¤ The objectives of the convention 
are to protect, by strict control, human 
health and the environment against the 
adverse effects which may result from the 
generation and management of hazard-
ous wastes and other wastes, and to en-
hance the control of transboundary 
movement of hazardous wastes and other 
wastes, thus creating incentives for their 
environmentally sound management and 
for the reduction of the volume of  such 
transboundary movement. The simple 
idea is that the less hazardous waste and 
other waste are produced, and the less 
they are transported with potentially risky 
consequences, the better the environment 
for all forms of life upon Earth. 
 
¤ The reform as such was instituted 
in order to minimize the adverse impacts 
of a human activity - that of hazardous 
waste production - by means of regulating 
the transboundary movements of, in the 
first place, hazardous waste, and, in par-
ticular, illegal traffic in hazardous wastes 
(see United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme 1993, part I, para. 6). This is 
supposed to be achieved by not permitting 
the export of hazardous wastes and other 
wastes if the state of import does not con-
sent in writing to the specific import, in the 
case where that state has not prohibited 
the import of such wastes. The states par-
ties shall designate or establish one or 
more competent authorities and one focal 
point to facilitate the implementation of the 
Convention (United Nations Environment 
Programme 1989, art. 5, para. 1). A state 
party shall further not permit any export to 
or import from a non-party state (op. cit., 
art. 4. para. 5 ). The risk for the production 
and presentation of false documents in 
this context is noted (op. cit., art. 9, para. 
1 (c & d)). Other adverse impacts, i.e. oth-
er potential crime risks, apparently were 
not considered. Money laundering and 
purposeful infiltration of legal businesses 
are not perhaps relevant this time in this 
respect8. Nonetheless, the potential for 
corruption as a separate crime risk cat-
egory should perhaps also have been 
notified in the convention. 
 
¤ In general, baseline data (to say 
nothing of statistics) on breaches against 
the stipulations of the Convention are not 
very systematic, although national focal 
points of the states which have ratified the 
Convention are supposed to report all 
incidents to the Secretariat. However, no 
comprehensive statistics in this category 
are available9, only anecdotal documenta-
tion on some of the cases reported to the 
Secretariat of the Convention. Thus, for 
                                                 
     8 At the national level, however, both these 
crime risk categories should in some cases be 
given a high relevance - in Italy, for example, 
the 'ecomafia' is considered a highly serious 
threat in this field (see, e.g., Legambiente). 
     9 It is, naturally, quite possible that the Sec-
retariat of the Convention elaborates internal 
statistical tables on the incidents on an annual 
basis, but access to these files is not neces-
sarily open. 
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example in the document by the Secretar-
iat on illegal traffic, presented  to the 
fourth meeting of the Conference of the 
Parties to the Basel Convention, con-
vened in October 1997, three incidents 
were reported in detail. In addition, it is 
stated that "on a few other occasions, the 
Secretatiat, through various sources in-
cluding the Governments of Contracting 
Parties, has been informed of cases of 
illegal traffic. In all of these cases, the 
Secretariat immediately contacted all 
States concerned, asking for clarification 
and offering assistance" (United Nations 
Environment Programme 1997, pp. 1-3). 
The problem of illegal conduct seems to 
exist, but, apparently, it is not a serious 
one.  
 
This view is confirmed by a study pro-
duced for the research workshop orga-
nized at the Ninth United Nations Con-
gress on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders, in 1995 (United 
Nations 1995b). Experts from eleven 
member states were requested to de-
scribe, inter alia, recent cases of trans-
boundary pollution involving traffic in haz-
ardous waste (UNICRI). Optimally, each 
national expert ought to have described 
three examples: (i) one case where the 
legal instruments available in the country 
were fully utilized or effective implementa-
tion took place, (ii) one case where the 
system failed, and (iii) one case being 
identified as environmentally harmful and 
likely to be dealt with by new strategies for 
better environmental protection. As a mat-
ter of fact, six national experts were able 
to report cases, on the whole, but not a 
single expert was able to report a case 
from all of the categories listed10. On the 
                                                 
     10 In fact, the number of experts reporting 
separate cases is only five, since two experts 
from neighboring countries reported one and 
other hand, data on the frequency of inci-
dents are not the most important know-
ledge in this field. It is equally vital to know 
for example that "the disposal of harmful 
waste in African countries became a 
common phenomenon in the eighties (...) 
because of the low level of environmental 
protection laws, and the abject powerty of 
these nations, the developed countries 
have, within the last decade, embarked 
upon 'toxic waste trade' or 'illegal dumping 
of toxic wastes' in poor debt-strapped de-
veloping countries" (op. cit., p. 171). 
The question of false documents is men-
tioned passim in a few of the cases de-
scribed, but no systematic information is 
provided on this aspect. No information 
whatsoever is provided on corruption as a 
preliminary step in trafficking in hazardous 
waste. 
 
¤ The international community, quite 
apparently, has taken a very serious view 
of the threat caused by trafficking in haz-
ardous waste, as demonstrated by the 
efforts to develop and implement the Ba-
sel Convention. Also the traffic in false 
documents has been considered in ear-
nest as a side issue. On the other hand, in 
this context perhaps more anticipatory 
weight should be attached to corruption as 
a separate potential crime risk category, 
since it is quite conceivable that trafficking 
in hazardous waste has been facilitated by 
bribing favourably inclined national offi-
cials. This must be seen as a real threat in 
all those regions of the world where cor-
ruption has become endemic, and can be 
considered an inherent element of the 
cultural structure. 
 
6.2 Directives on public procure-
                                                                   
the same case. 
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ment within the European Union/ 
European Community 
 
The second case to be analyzed is a clus-
ter of related European Community (the 
predecessor to the European Union) di-
rectives in the field of public procurement 
(93/37/EEC on public building contracts; 
93/36/EEC on public procurement of 
goods; 92/50/EEC on public procurement 
of services; 93/38/EEC on procurement in 
the fields of water and energy manage-
ment, traffic and telecommunications). 
 
¤ The common objectives of all four 
directives may be summarized as follows: 
To guarantee a sufficient level of competi-
tive tenders and to harmonize the proce-
dure concerning public procurement in the 
member states, all in order to promote the 
four freedoms: free movement of capital, 
goods, persons and services, respective-
ly. The member states are thus obliged to 
follow certain bidding procedures every 
time the bid price exceeds a certain 
amount of money (in ECUs), as ex-
pressed in the directives. 
 
¤ The adverse impacts of the reform, 
i.e. the potential crime risks, were appar-
ently not analyzed in detail when the direc-
tives were being drafted. The final text of 
the directives gives as reasons for exclud-
ing a bidder only factors that may have a 
negative impact on the exercise of the 
trade - bankrupcy, adjudication in a case 
involving an illegal act connected with the 
exercise of one's profession, serious fault 
in the course of business activity, failure to 
settle the imposed taxes or social security 
fees - or serious culpability in providing 
incorrect information in the context of the 
bidding procedure. On the other hand, 
actual illegal operations, i.e. purposeful 
infiltration of legal business, involving 
crimes of bribery and falsification of docu-
ments, are not considered at all. The texts 
of the directives also do not contain any 
reference to the main root of the criminal 
purpose that may be involved, the neces-
sity to invest laundered money. Attention 
should also be paid separately to bribery 
or corruption as a phenomenon in its own 
right, preferably in two configurations. 
First, there is the risk of gaining favours by 
means of offering bribes to the represent-
atives of the relevant national authorities. 
Second, in case a contract has been ob-
tained by means of corruption, the unsuc-
cessful competitors in the bid should re-
ceive some form of satisfaction. 
 
¤ In this case, as might be expected, 
the baseline data are totally circumven-
tive, since no quantitative information on 
the size of this particular problem in the 
member states is available. It is not 
known: (i) whether money laundering and 
purposeful infiltration are frequent pheno-
mena in this field, (ii) what amounts of 
money are moved illegally, or (iii) what 
portion of suspected offences are report-
ed to the competent authorities.11  At the 
same time, it is a well-established fact that 
these offences exist. Godson and Wil-
liams state that "criminal organizations try 
to dominate licit industries such as con-
struction and waste disposal" and add that 
"legitimate entrepreneurs find it difficult to 
operate profitably in an environment in 
which criminal organizations are active, 
but criminal enterprises are flourishing in a 
world of global business" (Godson & Wil-
liams, op. cit., pp. 7 - 8).  
                                                 
     11 Resources permitting it is naturally pos-
sible to conduct a survey requesting that the 
competent national enforcement authorities 
provide the existing data on these phenome-
na. 
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In respect of money laundering the Tran-
scrime research group claims that "a spe-
cific and widely-used method to launder 
the proceeds of crime is investment in licit 
activities, such as the construction busi-
ness" (Adamoli et al., p. 21). As to the 
purposeful infiltration of legal business, 
this is one of the eighteen categories of 
transnational crime identified by the Unit-
ed Nations Secretariat in its efforts to as-
sess the prevalence and extent of those 
crimes, as part of the Fourth United Na-
tions Survey of Crime Trends and Opera-
tions of Criminal Justice Systems (United 
Nations 1995a; see also Mueller).12 
 
Last but not least, the use of false docu-
ments as a separate category of illegal 
activity should be discussed. The falsifica-
tion or forging of documents is most often 
seen as a crime per se, or as a preparato-
ry phase in a fraud case, for example in 
the case of maritime frauds. Abhyankar 
asserts that this type of offences "are real-
ly documentary frauds which, of course, 
involve the use of false or forged docu-
ments used to deceive" (Abhyankar, p. 3), 
while Mueller and Adler speak about ma-
rine insurance frauds. They write that 
"where landlubbing insurance investiga-
tors can measure tire track marks, survey 
body damage, and inspect the insured 
object, or what is left of it, marine insur-
ance investigators normally can rely only 
                                                 
     12 Infiltration of legal business, however, 
was not noted as a punishable offence in any 
of the EU member states which responded to 
the survey, and no data whatsoever could be 
provided. Many of the instruments used in this 
kind of activity, however - falsification of doc-
uments, accounting offences, etc. - are as 
such independent criminal code offences in a 
majority, if not all, of the member states, as 
already noted in section 4.1.4. 
on circumstantial evidence. It is that which 
makes marine insurance fraud such an 
attaractive business" (Mueller & Adler, p. 
193). But as often presentation of false or 
forged documents should be seen as a 
preliminary stage in the purposeful infiltra-
tion of legal business, although "evidence 
about means and methods is sporadic", 
which means that "we do not know how 
many of the businesses which we are fre-
quenting daily have been infiltrated or are 
actually owned by transnational organized 
crime groups" (Mueller, p. 6). 
 
¤ For this reason, the evaluation of 
the seriousness of the problem, and of 
suggestions for the mitigation of the prob-
lem, must be based on qualitative esti-
mates. At the time the EC directives were 
issued the Dutch government expressed 
its concern over the growing incidence of: 
(i) the use of legal entities by criminal or-
ganizations, and (ii) the access of criminal 
organizations to government contracts, 
licences and subsidies (Lely & van Toorn, 
p. 1). The outcomes of this concern were, 
first, a study project and, second, the Pub-
lic Administration (Probity in Decision-
Making) Bill in the Netherlands. The aim 
of the Bill is to prevent the awarding of 
public contracts to tenderers who intend to 
implement the contract inter alia for the 
purpose of committing offences. Given the 
difficulty of producing direct evidence of 
intent in such cases, the determining fac-
tor will be the likelihood (my italics) of the 
tenderer having such intent (Reimer 
1998a, p. 2).  
 
In the Bill the following criteria for as-
sessing the likelihood are identified: (i) the 
connection between the person con-
cerned and offences that have already 
been committed, or his or her connection 
to offences which, on the grounds of facts 
or circumstances, can reasonably be ex-
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pected to be committed in the future, and 
(ii) the nature of those offences. An agen-
cy will be set up with the aim of having a 
tenderer screened to establish whether or 
not he or she has a criminal record. The 
agency will be authorized to consult 
closed sources, such as judicial, police 
and tax department files and files of social 
insurance bodies, as well as open 
sources, such as commercial registers 
and land registers. The contracting au-
thority will, on the basis of a report, decide 
whether a tenderer is to be excluded from 
the procurement procedure. The facts on 
which the decision is based must be spec-
ified, and, before reaching a final decision, 
the contracting authority is required to 
hear the tenderer in question. A tenderer 
may appeal to a court against the decision 
(op. cit., pp. 3-4).  
 
Obviously, the Dutch approach in terms of 
constructing a structure to minimize all the 
potentially harmful impacts connected with 
the EC public procurement directives is 
the line of action that the European Com-
munity should have taken when drafting 
these legislative instruments. One of the 
reasons for this oversight is quite evidently 
that the drafters did not have sufficient 
awareness of illegalities as an inherent 
problem in this context. This is all the 
more problematic, since in a recent Dutch 
study on, inter alia, administrative 
measures of the public authorities against 
criminal legal persons it was found that in 
most of the eight member states surveyed 
data from official registers are used to in-
vestigate irregularities within business or 
to investigate the bona fides, integrity, or 
solvency of contracting partners of the 
public authorities. In Italy, for example, the 
audits take place within the framework of 
the so-called anti-mafia cautions con-
tained in Law No. 55/1990 and Decree 
Lgs. No. 490/1994. Further plans exist to 
reform the legislation is such a way that 
more detailed information could be ob-
tained on the financial aspects of the peo-
ple actually running companies. The au-
dits are, however, limited to Italian entities 
(T.M.C. Asser Instituut, pp. 33 - 92). 
 
¤ It can thus be seen that fairly de-
tailed knowledge about anticipatory tools 
to mitigate the potential crime risks al-
ready exist. In addition to the ideas pre-
sented above the Dutch study lists other 
forms of preventive measures: (i) the use 
of financial and technical selection criteria 
in the case of procurement, (ii) controls 
over the use of sub-contractors, both prior 
to and during the course of the contract, 
and (iii) the use of contractual obligations 
and guarantees (op. cit., pp. 89 - 90). 
Ways and means of monitoring the im-
pacts of these potential preventive tools 
should be devised, in case any of them is 
found useful in the future. One particular 
problem associated with this kind of law 
reform involving a transnational scope, 
must, however, be solved before it is pos-
sible to proceed with more substantial re-
form measures. A compromise regarding 
adverse views on cooperative prevention 
efforts must be reached at an early phase 
of a reform programme. 
 
6.3. Draft treaty on the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment 
 
The third case study concerns an interna-
tional instrument currently under prepara-
tion. The case analysed is the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment, known by its 
acronym MAI. The latest information is 
that the preparative process has been 
postponed within the auspices of the 
OECD due to adverse views among the 
participating states (cf. “Update on the 
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MAI“; see also “The sinking of the MAI“). 
All the same, there is information that 
"many governments are favoring the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) as the 
preferred location for an MAI-like agree-
ment. Even though there is no consensus 
on this approach there is a good likelihood 
that investment will be placed on the WTO 
'millenium round agenda'" (“Update on the 
MAI“, p. 1). It is thus opportune to analyse 
what are the intentions of the proponents 
of this reform in terms of potential adverse 
impacts. 
 
¤ The objectives of the MAI are as 
follows: To provide an environment for 
international investors, with uniform rules 
on both market access and legal security. 
The aim is to eliminate barriers and distor-
tions to investment flows, to promote a 
more efficient allocation of economic re-
sources, and thereby to achieve higher 
economic growth, more jobs and in-
creased living standards. Thus, the main 
goal seems to be to create an investment 
climate that places all investors in one and 
the same position, notwithstanding na-
tional and other regulations, except for 
measures to protect essential national 
security interests and for any measures of 
participating countries that do not conform 
to the MAI obligations13 (cf. "the MAI; fre-
quently asked questions and answers", 
section 3). 
 
¤ At the outset the arrangement, if 
designed according to the guidelines 
                                                 
     13 Such as most-favoured nation treatment 
and performance requirements, i.e. conditions 
governments apply to the conduct of private 
business or to the use of public funds as an 
incentive for business or investment; the 
scope of country-specific exceptions must, at 
the same time, be acceptable to other parties 
to the agreement (op. cit., section 5). 
made explicit by the objectives, does not 
seem to give any reason for concern inso-
far as build-in crime risks are the point. 
Nor are any such risks taken into account 
in the drafting documents. The MAI is sup-
posed to be an instrument to produce 
equal investment conditions for all inves-
tors globally (no position is taken in this 
context on whether the MAI as such is 
expedient for all the partners or not). 
Comprehensive multilateral rules for in-
vestment are considered necessary, 
since: 
~ Investors need long-term stability 
of rules and procedures; 
~ Investors need protection of exist-
ing investments; 
~ Governments recognise that a 
liberal investment regime is critical 
to attracting foreign investment; 
~ Governments appreciate that re-
strictions and discriminatory 
measures distort investment flows 
with detrimental effects on eco-
nomic development and efficiency, 
and create a potential source of 
international friction; 
~ The greater the role of investment 
in the global economy, the more 
important it becomes to have a 
framework to address potential 
frictions (op. cit.). 
 
And, all the same, there should be early 
awareness of the fact that the quite cate-
gorical freedom of transnational invest-
ments will also attract money perhaps not 
earned by entirely honest means. Tran-
scrime, the research group on transna-
tional organized crime already cited 
above, reports that "criminal groups are 
frequently compared to legal businesses 
(...); both of them diversify their invest-
ments among different fields in order to in-
crease profits, and they seek to expand 
into new markets" (Adamoli et al., p. 18).  
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One quite clear-cut item is thus the in-
vestment of illegally gained assets with 
the purpose of laundering them or the 
investment of already laundered money. 
Walker, who examined the illegal money 
flows in and through Australia, makes an 
attempt in his report to establish the im-
pact money laundering has on the econ-
omy of the country as a whole. He points 
out that "money launderers will be very 
keen to purchase an asset such as a 
business or some real estate, because 
possession of the cash is potentially in-
criminating while possession of the busi-
ness or the land enables them to build 
apparently legitimate wealth" and contin-
ues that "they (the launderers) need not 
be too discriminating in the price they pay. 
They will outbid other potential buyers with 
more realistic and honest reasons for buy-
ing, not caring if they pay more than the 
true worth of the purchase" (Walker, p. 
37).  
 
Corruption is the second potential  risk 
factor that should be considered by the 
MAI drafters. Transparency International 
prepares annual global surveys of the 
level of corruption, producing lists of indi-
ces ranking countries according to the 
perception that business people have of 
their "cleanness" (cf. Transparency Inter-
national). Not a single country comes off 
quite clean on this list, and so early 
awareness as regards corruption is a 
must.14 Williams alleges that "where regu-
                                                 
     14 There is one more feature of the MAI 
structure, which, although not a potential crime 
risk as such, must be taken into account when 
the future direction of the MAI is debated. This 
factor is the strong push for investor protec-
tion. Thus, if an investor feels that he or she is 
being met with unreasonable and discriminato-
ry measures by the host state, due for exam-
ple to suspicions of money laundering, the 
investor would be able to submit the dispute 
lations are relatively lax or poorly imple-
mented in critical sectors such as finance 
and banking, this is an invitation for crimi-
nal organzations to move into the state 
and exploit the lacuna. In some cases, 
states even exploit these differences to 
attract dirty money by making clear that 
their financial sector does not observe 
'due diligence' in any serious way" (Wil-
liams, p. 9). 
 
¤ Again, although no baseline data 
on the prevalence of the illegal activities 
discussed here - money laundering and 
corruption - are available in the sense we 
customarily give to the concept, there ex-
ists a wealth of qualitative information as-
sociated with the phenomena we are in-
terested in. Transparency International, 
for example, has been able to establish, in 
its Corruption Perception Index, "an em-
pirical link (..) between the level of corrup-
tion and foreign direct investment" (Trans-
parency International, p. 3). An axiom to 
be kept in mind in this context is that "low 
levels of transparency encourage high 
levels of corruption" (Godson & Williams, 
p. 5). As to money laundering, it seems 
                                                                   
for resolution either to a competent court or to 
an administrative tribunal for arbitration. The 
forms of relief in a successful case - from the 
point of view of the investor - would be for 
example pecuniary compensation or restitution 
in kind (cf. MAI dispute settlement). Potential-
ly, it might be possible, in case of an investor 
who is laundering money, that the investor 
brings legal claims against the host govern-
ment, and is adjudicated monetary com-
pensation if the host government is unable to 
prove that the aim was to invest laundered 
money. Similarly, the MAI proposal to require 
compensation for expropriation or other gov-
ernment action which reduce the value of an 
investment might lead to legal indemnification 
to a dishonest investor. 
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appropriate to quote South: "One of the 
best ways to run a criminal enterprise is to 
have a legal foundation" (South, p.1). 
Walker, in his Australian money launder-
ing report, claims that "while there are no 
conclusive data on how the totality of laun-
dered money is invested, it is likely that 
much of it is invested in dwelling proper-
ties" (Walker, p. 36). Godson and Wil-
liams, on the other hand, are of the opin-
ion that "the banking sector and industries 
such as construction and waste disposal 
have become favorite targets for criminal 
activity" (Godson & Williams, p. 20). Thus, 
the option of transnationally invested 
laundered money should not be excluded. 
It is a real threat not to be ignored in the 
MAI context. 
 
¤ The problem in considering ways 
and means to mitigate crime risks is an 
ambiguous one. On one side, general 
adherence to law would seem to call for 
the kind of preventive measures - screen-
ing procedures with access to all relevant 
databases, contractual obligations and 
guarantees - described in connection with 
the previous case study on procurement. 
There is, on the other side, an additional 
dimension which makes the preventive 
efforts in this particular sector of illegal 
profit-making somewhat complicated. The 
MAI draft documents do not seem to call 
for a national control authority, as con-
trasted with the EC directives on procure-
ment with each of them listing competent 
authorities country by country.15 Without 
such national focal points, the coordina-
tion of preventive efforts, particularly antic-
ipatory ones, might become arduous. And, 
naturally,  continuous monitoring of the 
                                                 
     15 Cf. for example the EC Directive on pub-
lic procurement of goods (93/36/EEC), art. 21, 
para. 2.  
impact of the enforcement activities is 
necessary in order to ascertain that posi-
tive effects are attained. This procedure 
might be facilitated by giving adherence to 
the "Forty Recommendations" of the Fi-
nancial Action Task Force (FATF) (see 
Financial Action Task Force). The FATF, 
however, had not been contacted at all 
during the MAI drafting process as of mid-
September 1998 (Carlson).  
 
 
 
7. Lessons learned; why potential 
crime risks are considered only 
partially or not at all in law reform 
work that creates the potential for 
profit-making 
 
The cases studied here are fairly typical of 
law reforms with transnationally binding 
effect. The transnational angle was cho-
sen intentionally in order to shed light on 
the complicated aspects of bringing about 
a reform with profit-making implications - 
the transnational angle complications 
would not have been observed if only 
cases on the national level had been stud-
ied. What then are the main factors that 
have contributed to the overlooking of the 
anticipatory perspective in this type of 
reform? To start with, it must be noted that 
"like insurrectionists, members of transna-
tional criminal organizations are largely 
indistinguishable from civilian populations. 
Their activities undermine the fibers of 
society - its economic and financial struc-
ture, its polity, and its physical security - 
but do so in ways that only becomes ap-
parent when the process is well-advanced 
and therefore more difficult to counter" 
(Godson & Williams, p. 7). 
 
 Furthermore, one of the basic factors 
common to any reform project in this cat-
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egory, whether national or transnational, 
certainly is the educational and working 
life background of the law reform drafters. 
As a rule, they will not have had experi-
ence in law enforcement activities involv-
ing crimes for profit. They will also not 
have necessarily studied criminology, per-
haps not even criminal law. Thus, the en-
tire idea of early awareness as regards 
the potential of crime risks might be quite 
alien to them. If it is not possible to ar-
range the law reform project team so that 
it includes an expert on crime issues, one 
suggestion for remedying the situation is 
that at least an external expert on crime 
issues should be consulted already at an 
early phase of the reform project. Another 
observation in this respect is that "unless 
there is agreement on what the interna-
tional community is trying to achieve, the 
prospects for an effective strategy are 
negligible. Law enforcement personnel 
tend to focus less on strategy than on 
reactive, parochial responses, especially 
on arrests of a few leaders of organized 
crime groups" (op. cit., p. 25). 
 
The transnational scope of the law reform 
projects is apt to complicate even more 
the already otherwise difficult promotion of 
these projects. We have seen that one of 
the most important prerequisites for suc-
cessful prevention of illegal profit making 
is access by the competent authority to 
relevant data. Also, to quote Godson and 
Williams, "since transnational criminal 
organizations are often network based, it 
is important to create parallel cross-border 
networks of law enforcement officers who 
also develop a relationship of trust with 
one other, and can therefore exchange 
tactical and operational information with a 
high degree of confidence" (op. cit., p. 30). 
The current practice in terms of protection 
of privacy and data security is, on the na-
tional level and even more on the inter-
national level, that they are strictly regu-
lated, for example in the Council of Eu-
rope member states by the "Convention 
for the Protection of Individuals with re-
gard to Automatic Processing of Personal 
Data" (Council of Europe). Sometimes 
even at the national level legitimate infor-
mation needs are obstructed with the plea 
that privacy issues will be at stake, and 
the problems are multiplied when transna-
tional information needs are discussed. A 
case in point is for example the European 
Union Convention on Europol. Eighteen of 
the 47 articles regulate different aspects 
of information processing - protection of 
privacy, obligation to provide information, 
national supervisory authority, etc. (see 
European Union, 1995, art. 7 - 23, 25). 
The European Union is also examining 
initiatives aiming at a high level of harmo-
nisation of data protection provisions (Eu-
ropean Union, 1998). 
 
The transnational scope affects the elabo-
ration of the projects also through de-
mands for harmonization and uniformity - 
a national partner to a transnational 
agreement is not always allowed to imple-
ment nationally measures that are stricter 
than the ones prescribed in the agree-
ment.16 A good example of this is the 
Dutch effort, cited above, to screen the 
tenderers more closely than what is pre-
scribed in the EC Directives. The Dutch 
Government informed the European Com-
mission about the project and about the 
relation of the project to the criteria laid 
down by the Directives. In its reaction the 
                                                 
     16 Thus, the European Union stipulates that 
the national legislation of the member states 
must not deviate from the principle guarantee-
ing the four freedoms - free movement of capi-
tal, people, products and services, respectively 
- within the Union. 
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Commission agreed with the instruments 
of the planned law reform in general. The 
Commission, however, stressed that new 
grounds for exclusion and qualitative se-
lection cannot be created within the Bill, 
as long as these do not fit within the exist-
ing system of the Directives (Reimer 
1998a, p. 3). A procedure resulting in the 
acceptance of a lowest common denomi-
nator formulation of the details of a reform 
thus, as a rule, is the outcome of the 
whole. 
 
It is also possible that the evidence con-
cerning crime risks associated with law 
reform projects involving profit-making, at 
the national level and even more so at the 
transnational level, must be really strong 
so that the anticipatory approach could 
materialize. But, as we have seen, the 
lack of baseline data very often is apt to 
result in a major obstacle in this respect. 
One suggestion put forth by Godson and 
Williams is that "the kind of competitive 
intelligence that is now so pervasive in the 
business world could usefully be applied 
to criminal enterprises. Such an approach 
would highlight both strengths and weak-
nesses, as well as opportunities and con-
straints. Insofar as the rise of transnation-
al criminal organizations can be under-
stood in terms of opportunities, incentives 
and pressures, and resources, then con-
stricting opportunities, removing pressures 
and incentives, and degrading resources 
would go some way towards halting or 
even reversing the momentum of growth 
and development currently enjoyed by 
criminals" (Godson & Williams, p. 2). 
 
As to the preventive measures concerning 
the particular crime categories dealt with 
in this analysis - money laundering, cor-
ruption, security of documents and pur-
poseful infiltration of legal business  - the 
following tools should perhaps be given 
precedence: 
 
* Money laundering matters - the 
minimum precaution in the drafting 
of all relevant legislative texts of 
the type discussed in this paper 
should be the application, where 
appropriate, of the Forty Recom-
mendations of the Financial Action 
Task Force (see Financial Action 
Task Force); 
 
* Corruption and bribery - the mini-
mum precaution in the drafting of 
all relevant legislative texts of the 
type discussed in this paper 
should be the application, where 
appropriate, of the recommenda-
tions for national integrity systems 
developed by Transparency Inter-
national (see Pope); 
 
* Security of documents - the mini-
mum precaution in the drafting of 
all relevant legislative texts of the 
type discussed in this paper 
should be a requirement, where 
practicable, that the latest crypto-
graphic technology is utilized in 
order to help to prove the origin of 
the information contained in the 
documents, and in order to help to 
verify whether information has 
been altered; 
 
* Purposeful infiltration of legal 
business - the minimum precau-
tion in the drafting of all relevant 
legislative texts of the type dis-
cussed in this paper should be the 
adaption, where appropriate, of 
the screening and other control 
mechanisms under development 
in connection with the Dutch Pub-
lic Administration (Probity in Deci-
sion-Making) programme (see 
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section 6.2. above). 
  
 
8. Ideas for further exploration of 
the issue 
 
Two issues seem to need further explora-
tion within the scope of law drafting activi-
ties of the type discussed in this text. One 
is the question of the amount of the evi-
dence that is necessary, as discussed 
above. Would it suffice to establish a link - 
no matter how weak, taking into consider-
ation the problem of the lack of baseline 
data, on one side, and the Dutch attempts 
to establish the likelihood of criminal intent 
as a criterion for disqualification of dis-
honest bidders, on the other - between the 
potential crime risks and the phenomenon 
that the planned reform is supposed to 
regulate? If not, what should be the mini-
mun prerequisites for anticipative reac-
tions? How should we take into account 
the pressure tactics (such as lobbying) of 
potential targets of a reform, those who 
could profit from loopholes in the measu-
res? 
 
Another issue in the anticipatory process 
that requires more careful examination is 
the screening phase in the procedure to 
establish whether or not a candidate is 
qualified. What kinds of precautions ought 
to be observed in the context of screening 
in terms of privacy protection or of man-
dates for the competent authorities? And 
what could be the mechanisms for design-
ing screening options in a transnational 
context? 
 
The potential risks of crime brought about 
by the current tendency of globalization 
should perhaps also be discussed more 
thoroughly, particularly in the light of what 
diminishing public surveillance in the fi-
nancial sphere might mean in terms of 
increasing crime opportunities. The grow-
ing globalization of business and financial 
transactions (legal and illegal ones alike) 
makes it increasingly problematic to target 
crime prevention methods by means of 
traditional methods alone. New ways and 
means for anticipatory approaches should 
be explored. 
 
Lastly, efforts should perhaps be devoted 
to finding out whether the CRA as a 
methodological tool is capable of antici-
pating potential crime risks more general-
ly, in association with a wider sphere of 
illegal activities. Of particular interest in 
this respect should, for example, be the 
potential for computer and cybercrime, 
environmental crime, and different forms 
of economic crime. Also, testing the ap-
plicability of the CRA approach in the 
framework of more conventional illegal 
activities in the property crime category 
should be given serious thought. And, 
above all, "carefully and sharply delineat-
ed threat assessments are required to 
facilitate prescription and to underpin poli-
cy" (Godson & Williams, p. 17), since 
"more aggressive measures to decapitate 
the leadership of criminal enterprises, 
undermine the integrity of their organiza-
tions, and strip them of their assets are 
needed" (op. cit., p. 25), keeping in mind 
that "since money is the foundation of 
most criminal enterprises, denying the the 
ability to move and use money as they 
please is a key objective for the interna-
tional community" (op. cit., p. 29). This is 
confirmed by Mueller who writes that "ul-
timately - and all of the world's isolationists 
to the contrary notwithstanding - we need 
a certain globalization of law enforcement 
and criminal justice efforts in order to deal 
with globe-threatening criminal activities" 
(Mueller, p. 15). 
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9. Concluding remarks 
 
The cases studied in this paper prove 
fairly indisputably that the potential for 
crime risks is always present when con-
sidering legislative efforts that open up the 
possibility of making a profit. Consequent-
ly, the crime risk aspect should always be 
given serious thought when a law reform 
project is planned. In other words, it would 
seem that advance readiness is more cost 
effective than retroactive preventive ef-
forts, and may also somewhat lower the 
initial costs. Thus, in order to make the 
most of the existing preventive capacity an 
early awareness perspective should al-
ways be incorporated in the drafting of 
legislation, resulting in an anticipatory ap-
proach. It is not, however, suggested that 
all aspects of life should be given norma-
tive frameworks - that would impede the 
realisation of human rights and civil liber-
ties even more effectively than any threat 
posed by organized crime. Nonetheless, if 
early awareness of criminal opportunities 
can be established, and if, in addition, a 
relatively modest cost of acting preemp-
tively can be foreseen, then it is high time 
for action by the policymakers. 
 
To recapitulate, in respect of reforming 
legislation that opens up the possibility of 
making a profit the anticipatory approach 
will best be achieved, both nationally and 
transnationally, by means of: (i) in-
corporating the efforts of all relevant part-
ners in the reform work, (ii) securing the 
best available external expertise, and (iii) 
assessing the potential crime risks asso-
ciated with the reform utilizing, for ex-
ample, the Crime Risk Assessment (CRA) 
method. 
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Annex I 
 
THE BASIC FEATURES OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT (EIA) 
 
This brief overview is based on "Methods of EIA" by Morris, P. & Therivel, R. (eds.) (UCL 
Press: London, 1995, pp. 4-6). The various phases of EIA are as follows: 
 
(i) A preliminary review in order to decide whether to carry out an EIA (screening), 
with a view to the potential consequences of the adverse impacts on the natural, 
built-up and social environment of the proposed project; 
 
(ii) A study to examine the objectives of the proposed project and alternatives to it 
(scoping), always taking into account also the so-called 'zero alternative', i.e. con-
tinuing along the present line of action; 
 
(iii) Selection of relevant parameters for describing the environmental components, 
and for identifying and observing the impacts, including the direct, indirect, aggre-
gate and synergetic impacts, to the extent the interest groups involved find neces-
sary; 
 
(iv) Delineation of the impact options; a more thorough assessment should be given 
of those options that the parties involved regard as the most significant; 
 
(v) Retrieval, analysis and presentation of baseline data, attaching particular im-
portance to describing the current status of those factors that are considered to 
be the most significant; 
 
(vi) Comparison of the proposed project and alternatives, by organizing and presen-
ting information in such a way that it is possible to utilize it in decision making; 
 
(vii) Interpretation and evaluation of the weight of the impacts, with the aim of ascer-
taining probabilities and risks involved, also charting the geographical and social 
distribution, and the time-scale of the impacts; 
 
(viii) Presentation of the ways and means of mitigating adverse impacts, by first estab-
lishing the acceptable risk levels and then presenting measures to bring adverse 
impacts down to those levels, while at the same time not neglecting to identify the 
unavoidable adverse impacts; 
 
(ix) Elaboration of a draft EIA report for comment by all partners involved; 
 
(x) Review of the draft EIA report by all partners involved; 
 
(xi) Preparation of the final EIA report, taking into account the comments received; 
 
(xii) Making of the actual decision, either as proposed in the original project plan, or 
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as modified or rejected as the result of the EIA procedure; 
 
(xiii) Monitoring of the impacts during and after the implementation; 
 
(xiv) Auditing the project in order to compare the forecasted and materialized out-
comes, in order to assess the functioning of the monitoring programme, and to 
gain experience with a view to future EIA processes. 
 
